Germans as well as other European visitors. Its professed goal was the study of the common housing crisis, resulting public health concerns, and possible solutions. 2 Its founding members noted that not just Berlin or German cities, but cities across Europe were facing common challenges of housing and providing for the health and well-being of their inhabitants. 3 The committee did not simply invoke the example of Berlin, London or Paris; Amsterdam, Warsaw, Leningrad and other cities were just as present in the debates, again for sharing similar problems. As will be shown, numerous other examples of the awareness of the Pan-European nature of the problem can be invoked, from Surgeon Generals' communications and international relief organization to the public press of the day.
Indeed, the housing crisis was one of the common problems in immediate postwar Europe. Wars tend to unsettle and shift populations, and create homelessness. But this war initiated by Nazi Germany, subsequent occupations, war tactics, and war-related scarcity of resources for regular construction and repairs-even in countries less affected by bombings-unsettled so much more than the wars before. The subsequent result: millions of Europeans were homeless. Countless popular publications on the problem of housing were published in the middle and late 1940s. Whether one looks at specialized publications of the time, such as the United Nations Refugee Relief organization's "Europe's Homeless Millions," communications from Surgeon Generals of various European countries or military occupations, or even any popular newspaper of the latter half of the 1940s, the discourse included a large public. 4 While the attention to destruction and rubble may have created an image of total destruction of European cities rather than partial loss of dwelling spaces, the housing crisis was indeed acute. Problems as they appeared in Berlin were mirrored across Germany. In Germany's larger cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more, on average 40 percent of housing was destroyed. All in all, roughly 7 million persons lost their homes. 5 The housing and health problems were prominent across Europe. In France, for example, where the housing crisis has been studied by historians Danièle Voldman, Frédérique Boucher and (Cambridge, 2003) , 28-30. 5 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Mark Schramm, "The strategic bombing of German cities during World War II and its impact on city growth," Journal of Economic Geography v. 4 (2004) , 201-218; F. Kästner, Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Gemeinden 37 (1949) , 361-391. there was severe damage. Estimates point to 20 percent of French housing stock affected, resulting in several million homeless. 6 Italy had lost roughly one million homes. 7 In Britain and the Soviet Union, the housing shortages were even higher than in Berlin, as many contemporaries were keenly aware. 8 And Poland, for example, had lost 45 percent of its urban housing stock, with some cities in Western Poland and the city of Warsaw suffering as much as 80 percent loss of housing. 9 Despite massive destruction, evacuees, displaced persons, refugees and others were flocking to these cities. In brief, most countries across Eastern, Western and Central Europe emerged from the war with the two-fold reality of population influx and destruction of dwellings.
10 And in every case, the severe housing crisis affected urban centers disproportionately. The scholarly literature to date has noticed the loss of housing, but it has mainly been interested in reconstruction and building debates. As it turns out though, reconstruction was not an option in the late 1940s due to a lack of funds and raw materials, nor was it the most immediate concern.
The loss of housing of course did not only have architectural implications. More importantly, it was central to public safety, public health and welfare debates. And it may have led Europeans, including the European middle class and persons not generally thought of as championing state involvement, to embrace the idea of redi- (Milan, 1993 1941-1949, (Washington, 1950 Space, 1945 Space, -1975 (New York: 2005) 9 Glowny Urzad Staystyczny Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, ed., Tablice Statistyczne 1953-1954, (Warsaw, 1956) , 381-387; Gregor Thum, Die Fremde Stadt: Breslau 1945 (Berlin, 2003) SBZ/DDR und in Polen, 1945 -1956 (Göttingen, 1998) . On statistics, see especially Katherine Lebow, Nowa Huta, 1949 -1957 Stalinism and the transformation of everyday life in Poland's "first sociality city" (New York, 2002) stribution of resources and housing. Moreover, the Berlin case shows that in not only health officials and medical experts from the district, municipal and national levels were concerned with health and housing. Allied political officers, police, military, and architectural experts were just as much concerned. They agreed that not just the general health was at stake. Finally, as will be shown, they would concur that a concerted effort was necessary to address a number of pressing concerns.
But what were the primary motivations for Allied actors to be involved with health and housing questions? One British Military observer in Germany put it into words typical of the military records describing the Berlin setting and the health and housing concerns of the Allies. He observed in October 1946: "The loss of housing accommodation as a result of war and the influx of refugees has created a housing situation -which is grave and probably unprecedented in history. Everything that can be done must be done and done quickly."
11 And he continued, warning that lest there be rapid improvement of the situation, "the living conditions ... coupled with … a harsh winter may bring in their train not just death, [and] disease, but also serious discontent, and even ... popular unrest."
12 The letter, sent to the British High Command and fellow Allies, is marked "urgent." These were the main concerns then: First, the fear of disease and the outbreak of epidemics. Second, the fear of subsequent discontent and unrest and thus, ultimately, the question of governability.
Allied concerns about the spread of illness and the outbreak of epidemics had gained in urgency over time. Not all were initially alarmist, yet in the most moderate health reports of the summer of 1945, housing and fears about health already featured prominently. Compared to many other European cities, Berlin and its residents at first seemed fairly healthy to members of the Allied Housing and Public Health department. This would not necessarily remain so, medical observers noted early on. Thus, upon surveying the city in June-July 1945, one public health report of the US Military Government in Germany instructed the US Surgeon General that "destruction … ha [d] the given conditions "the general health of German civilians" was "surprisingly good." 14 This would change quickly. Health concerns grew with increasing in situ knowledge of the availability of medical services, of the general public health and the increased infection rates of contagious diseases, and of the city's altered topography and infrastructure. Moreover, from late July on, the Allies and Berlin municipal offices collected detailed health statistics and infection rate reports every week from every Berlin administrative district and hospital which allowed them to identify areas of primary concern.
15
Allied and municipal epidemic investigations in Berlin, as in Potsdam, may have also relied on neighborhood-based volunteer sanitary helpers and so-called Seuchenwarte. They had deployed the latter systematically to inspect all streets. The sanitary wardens also had to "visit all apartments on a daily basis" in a given neighborhood and report on any seemingly ill persons. 16 Their reports only drove home the point to housing officials that something had to be done quickly in light of the "threatening … situation."
17 In addition, the Allies could rely on their own extensive health, hospital and housing surveys, conducted street by street, block by block, in the autumn of 1945. In these surveys they noted the availability of services, the health of the residents, as well as the crowd index, i.e. the number of persons living in one room. 18 Finally, also the increased exchange of information across occupation zones helped show the extent of the health crisis.
Based on the evidence gathered in 1945 and early 1946, the Allies considered Berlin to be headed into a health catastrophe. Like most European cities affected by the war, the spread of disease threatened to take on epidemic, if not pandemic, dimensions. By the end of 1945, Berliners were ailed by typhoid fever, typhus, dysentery, diphtheria, influenza, cholera and tuberculosis, and some of these illnesses were spreading very rapidly. 19 While it may not be unusual to see these in a population of nearly three million, the rates at which they were spreading appeared disconcerting. For example, within just one month, between June and July 1945, the number of persons registered as infected with dysentery in the Russian Zone of Berlin doubled from 1,100 cases to 2,380.
20 By September 1945, even American officials noted that the local population was not that healthy after all. Furthermore, medical observers worried that Allied and Berlin medical provisions, even if combined, would still be marked by pronounced shortages in vaccines, penicillin, equipment and personnel, and would not suffice to quell an outbreak of epidemics. 21 The overall health of Berlin residents, like that of other European city dwellers, seemed to be taking a downward turn.
22
Why become engaged, though? Allied officials in Berlin seldomly invoked humanitarian reasons for improving the health of local populations. Germans, they reminded themselves, had brought this calamity upon themselves. 23 Debates in a variety of committees concerned with funding showed the prominent reasoning that since the Nazi Regime had so aggressively pursued war in the name of the wellbeing of the Aryan volk while bringing about immense suffering on the side of its victims, it was now only fair for Germans to suffer, even physically. Certainly, German standards of living were not to exceed those of other European countries.
24
According to this vein of debate, if Allied resources were to be dispersed in Germany at all, they were to be administered only to those in most dire need, i.e. the ill and homeless. 25 And even here, if humanitarian reasons were invoked, they concerned mostly children.
26
A more prominent motivation for engaging in public health planning was the fear of contagion that would transgress class, political and geographical boundaries. Such concerns mirrored those expressed by governments and public health specialists of earlier centuries through to their contemporaries. 27 Furthermore, "modern transportation" itself, as U.S. President Harry Truman had reminded the future World Health Organization, had made it "impossible for a nation to protect itself 20 1942 , Section V, (Boston, 1945 27 See the rationale for boards of health established in 16th century Italian cities, the reforms advocated by Johann Peter Frank, Jeremy Bentham, Edwin Chadwick, or records of 19th century international conferences such as the International Sanitary Conference in Istanbul, 1866. against the introduction of disease by quarantine."
28 Ill and healthy would mix. Though quarantining was still a prominent approach-at borders or points of transit such as train stations-governments and military occupations had realized the degree to which boundaries between countries, between their residents, between occupiers and occupied would be permeable. In the Berlin case, this meant the health of Berliners was directly linked to that of their occupiers. In consequence, it was in the interest of the health of the Allied own troops and employees themselves to push for policies that benefited the health of the general public. A cordon sanitaire between local populations and military occupiers is never possible. Allied units, in moves similar to that of Berlin upper classes in the course of industrialization, relocated from the inner city neighborhoods to the outer districts, for example to Dahlem, Karlshorst, Reinickendorf, and Spandau, in order to get away from the unhealthy and unsanitary inner city. 29 However, there was no way to create the "sanitary border" which Allied health professionals had at first called for. 30 The contacts were simply too many.
Where and how could illnesses spread from occupier to occupied? The stories of rapes and acts of intimate fraternization-often taking place in Berlin homes and basements-have been well documented.
31 Not only the Red Army command but also western Allied officials acknowledged the fact that physical interactions between German civilians and occupation personnel would inevitably take place, despite fraternization bans. 32 Noting that in German cities "the social chaos among civilians" had made "unusually difficult … the adjustment of the relationships between soldiers and civilians," one secret American health report from late May 1945, addressed to the US Surgeon General, advised that is was "not practicable to take action which [would] materially reduce contact between soldiers and prosti-28 Harry Truman, "Letter of Welcome to the Inaugural Meeting on June 22, 1946," cited in United Nations, Chronicle of the World Health Organization, v. 1, n. 1 (1947), 8. 29 William Durie, Friedrich Jeschonnek, Dieter Riedel, et. al., Alliierte in Berlin: 1945 .
32 For an excellent study of US-German fraternization, see especially Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender and Foreign Relations (New Haven, 2003). tutes."
33 In addition to the spread of venereal diseases like syphilis and gonorrhea, such intimate contact could lead to a spread of typhoid fever, influenza, dysentery, diphtheria and other contagious illnesses which occurred with increasing frequency among military personnel stationed in Berlin.
34
The Allies had to fear contagion not merely as a result of intimate physical interactions. There were many other areas of contact. Allied housing officers could, for example, catch infections on their inspection tours, as happened to Major Nuttall who contracted dysentery. 35 Berliners and Allies shared the same water, sometimes the same food. They frequented the same train stations and the same streets. And sometimes they even lived under the same roof and shared the same sanitary equipment.
36 Furthermore, German employees worked for military administrations of all four Allies. In particular the German food handlers, cooks, and kitchen help for the occupiers, both in the garrisons and the villas of the Highest Command, could and did spread disease. Thus, the "outbreak of disease … among civilians" could "sufficiently endanger troops or seriously impede military operations."
37
Another member of the military government in Berlin had to remind his superior abroad that the call for funding to improve Berlin's hygienic infrastructure did not primarily stem from empathy with Berliners. Rather, he noted: "The problem of sanitation in Berlin is of paramount importance for all of us who live here." 38 The records point to a Berlin-based conclusion that reducing the "reservoir [of] infection… among German civilians" would best ensure the health of the occupying forces.
39
Reducing this reservoir of infection took many forms and involved individual efforts as well as those of various branches of Allied and municipal government. Over time, a consensus emerged which held that uncoordinated action would not suffice in light of the serious health crisis. Instead, unified planning and the apparatus of the state would be necessary to address the problem.
Initially, though, measures for reducing the threat of the spread of epidemics were taken sector by sector. Reducing the reservoir of disease at first literally related to reservoirs and water supplies. Sanitizing the cityscape physically, removing rubble, shells, corpses of men and animals alike, repairing sewage pipes, and draining cess-pools was one way in which Allies and Berliners went about addressing questions of hygiene and infrastructure. 40 These efforts, often initiated at district levels, were uncoordinated.
Only upon the arrival of large groups of returning evacuees, refugees, and socalled displaced persons (DPs) did the Allied Control Commission create joint policies for Berlin. Despite common interests, these too only emerged with experience on the ground. As Berlin municipal police noted in July 1945, every day between 5000 and 6000 refugees and DPs arrived in Berlin's over-extended train stations, where homeless Berliners were already residing. 41 By the winter months 1945-1946, the records speak of 500,000 refugees a month traversing Berlin.
42
Allied and railroad personnel were not the only ones who regarded DPs and refugees as a menace. Berliners shared the view of Allied and municipal administrators which regarded such people as a "hearth of disease," a "flood," "wave," or "stream" of menacing proportions threatening the health of the community. 43 A police order of the Berlin district of Friedrichshain simply read: "Travelers passing through Berlin who touch [sic] our district … must leave ... immediately."
44 Contagion, again, was to be prevented. Very likely, these refugees, DPs, and former camp inmates were indeed of poor health. Once in proximity to others, Allies and Berliners feared, they might spread their illness or the host of their illness quickly. However, at first policies were at the level of each occupation zone. Soviet decrees from October 19, 1945 demanded that 36,000 German railroaders be immunized against typhoid fever, 11,500 in the Soviet Zone of Occupation alone. But medicine and disinfectants were constantly in short supply in Berlin, and not all could be immunized. 45 Meanwhile, delousing stations, which refugees and returnees were required to visit, or soap and boiling water provided at 40 the Bahnhofsmission shack, only provided limited protection. 46 In July 1945, the first unsettled persons to arrive were therefore kindly advised to leave Berlin unless they were already in the care of Berlin relatives. 47 This strategy proved ineffective with the arrival of ever more refugees. Soon, the tone changed. Those in positions of power concluded that the simplest way to protect the health of the community was to quarantine and ban refugees altogether, and thus limit the spread of disease. By 1946, the Allies agreed on a common policy: any refugee traveling "wildly" [wildreisend] and not as part of a group under Allied supervision, was to be captured, taken to the station master, quarantined, delivered to Allied authorities, and forced to leave the city within 24 hours. 48 Organized mass transports of refugees and DPs which entered the city were also to be held in quarantine, watched night and day by military police and local auxiliary forces. Eventually, in every sector, they were to leave the city within less than a day, refugees and DPs being carried to camps set up outside the city which would provide medical care.
49
What, however, was to be done with residents within the city and the continuous fear and reality of spreading disease? Military officials and their health officers throughout 1945 to 1948 lamented a shortage of immunizations for German civilians and their own populations; in this area, the means were limited.
50
The best possible protection, Allies and Berliners came to agree, was to remove the ill, homeless Berliners from the streets and send them to hospitals. Yet the responses here showed different strategies and signs of conflict amongst the Allies. Upon their arrival, hospitals already had been filled beyond capacity, so often infected patients were turned away to stay in already crowded apartments where the tenants or owners would be made to share their dwelling space. Patients known to be contagious lay in mixed-use buildings which served as general hospital, school and housing facilities all at once -or they had simply been sent home. 51 At home though, in crowded living conditions, the sick sharing rooms with healthy could spread their illnesses further. Allied observers and local public health experts deemed the proximity of Allies, city employees, infectious patients, school children, and residents "not advantageous in the long run." 52 Indeed, Berlin health officials frequently compared different responses and health conditions. They thus provide examples of concrete conflicts arising from the various Allied strategies and of tensions between municipal health planners and their Allied counterparts. For example, the close proximity of ill and healthy in Zehlendorf (US Zone) and Lichtenberg (Soviet Zone) left Berlin municipal health personnel outright appalled. 53 In one case, observers noted more than 500 tuberculosis patients were made to share space with students and nurses residing in a school building. 54 As municipal health evaluator Hassenpflug noted, hospital beds for the sick and elderly, as well as overall medical provisions for Berliners were particularly poor in the northeast and east, i.e. the Soviet Sector. The Soviet-occupied districts of Kaulsdorf, Marzahn, Wuhlgarten, and Lichtenberg were singled out. 55 Here, former military barracks which had been turned into hospitals during National Socialist governance were now being used to house healthy Soviet troops rather than the ill and contagious Berliners. Indeed, compared to other Allies, the Soviets required more potential housing or hospital space as they sought to isolate their personnel more than the Western Allies did. Not only in the realm of health, but possibly also in political ideology, contagion concerns may have been at the forefront of Soviet policy. Noting the overall lack of joint Allied initiative, the lack of resources in the Soviet areas, and the inconsistent measures even among each Allied group, Berlin observers called increasingly for a concerted effort and long-term planning in light of the numerous "inappropriate improvisations." Having likened many of the Allied health policies to "Nonsens" [sic], they pushed for greater Berlin municipal participation in health policy and for grand planning.
56
The approach of favoring state and municipal involvement in providing sufficient housing and hospital space and the propagation of the isolation of patients already had a long tradition in Berlin. In his March 1882 lectures at the HygieneInstitut of Berlin's Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität, Robert Koch had demanded measures to prevent the spread of infections. They required not only the isolation of patients with open tuberculosis, but most notably, state-and municipality-organized initiatives to improve unfavorable housing conditions. Enough ventilation 52 AKAB, Scharoun-Nachlass, Mag 3/5, I, Reports to Allied Kommandatura on hospital capacity and overcrowding by Prof. Hassenpflug and space would be key. 57 Ultimately, patients and healthy would be separated, once enough hospital space became available.
Yet at which level was health policy to operate? Should there be centralized plans for all of Germany? Should policy operate at the municipal level in a centralized way? At the district level in a decentralized way? The suggestions were many, and the debate about the level at which health care was to be administered continued, not least in response to Nazi policies which had centralized municipal health and welfare while creating competing Reich and NS party agencies to execute them.
58
Suffice it to note that district and municipal health and housing administrators alike advocated the centralized, comprehensive "hygienische Durchplanung Berlins," with plans coming from the municipality. 59 Meanwhile, according to these same municipal observers, the funding for comprehensive measures should come from both Berlin municipality as well as from the state, in this case the Allied Kommandatura. 60 Initiatives by private insurance companies for repairing hospitals and privately operated hospitals were apparently accepted, though not favored, by Allies or Berlin municipal supervisors. They regarded the private businesses as operating out of business interest, not public health interest. Indeed, more than once, private villas had received building materials and been reconstructed under the guise of operating as a private clinic, never to actually provide the promised services. 61 The same municipal observers meanwhile lauded the Allied Kommandants' joint provision of 4 million Reichsmark in emergency funds to the Magistrate of Berlin for 10,000 extra hospitals beds, as the right approach. 62 Such calls were indeed eventually met with concerted Allied action by late 1946. Consequently, the Allies jointly agreed to additional funding for the construction of hospitals, for hospital salaries, as well as the provision of building materials, all in response to the urgently perceived danger of epidemics.
63
Before a concerted response of the type described above materialized in 1946, the different districts and Kommandaturas had taken individual measures against the spread of epidemics, in particular regarding overcrowding and the mixing of infected and healthy residents. The Soviets were the first to do so, both in terms of health infrastructure and actual projects. Per Soviet Military Administration Decree 17, a central health administration, Zentralverwaltung für Gesundheitswesen, had been set up in the Soviet occupation zone. 64 While it differed significantly from NS racial hygiene goals and propagated an egalitarian approach as well as preventative medicine, it followed the NS path of expanding and centralizing the state-run public health system. 65 Turning to specific interventions, the Red Army had also set up extra infectious disease hospital care in the district of Prenzlauer Berg in late spring 1945. Correspondence among different Allied health offices show that within days of the US and British arrival in Berlin, competition was prominent. Thus, Soviet health administrators urged American health officials to set up extra infectious disease centers in their central districts, e.g. in the populous district Neukölln which was especially short of infectious disease hospital beds. 66 In addition, they pointed to poor housing structures and crowded living conditions in the West, which, in their opinion, worsened the health situation. 67 On the other hand, health and welfare offices in the American-controlled districts of Berlin permitted and encouraged aid from outside agencies. These included not just churches and neighborhood charity organizations, but, for example, support from the Swedish Red Cross, the Swiss Red Cross, the International Red Cross, and eventually US health and humanitarian aid organizations which had been approved by CRALOG, the Council of Relief Agencies licensed to operate in Germany.
68
The Allied material responses to specific housing problems-to broken windows, exposure to elements, or lack of ventilation-presents another example of the slow emergence of concerted state planning in the interest of public health. Destruction of windows had led to residents being exposed to elements, with detrimental effects particularly during the winter months. Health officials had noted the rise in pneumonia and other acute respiratory diseases. 69 As counter-measure, warming halls were set up for thousands of Berliners, initially by individual districts, later in a more coordinated manner. This followed a tradition of emergency relief already established by the district social services during the Third Reich and harkening back to the first Berlin warming hall of 1891. Also, by private residents' initiative, or in the Soviet and British cases, per Allied decree, windows had been covered by wool cloth, cardboard, wooden planks, or bricks, so as to make some rooms heatable. This however had limited the supply of fresh air and presented new health challenges, aggravated further by overcrowding. On their joint tours of Berlin dwellings, the members of the Allied Housing and Health Boards had noted numerous cases of serious overcrowding, with up to 15 persons residing in one room.
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Bricked up windows and dense settlement featured prominently in health and housing experts' discourses about the health of Berlin's residents in this early post-69 NARA OMGUS RG 260 AG 720, 1945 -46, Public Health, Berlin Report, Dec.1945 , Jan. 1946 Apr. 1946, 24 Apr. 1946. 70 Therefore, when housing conditions were linked with health, and the call came for state involvement, this was part of a longer tradition. Despite this longer tradition of state involvement, the immediate postwar years were a period of particularly noteworthy convergence in regards to welfare and public health thinking. The postwar material setting and the urgent threat of spreading epidemics had made actors on all sides embrace concerted intervention.
Next to the specific material conditions and health crisis, a key reason for the postwar embrace of state intervention lay in the very weakness of the state. In Germany, as in most European countries, the immediate postwar period saw strong state apparatuses coupled with weak, tenuous governments. The provision of welfare came out of the very weakness of postwar governments. As British Miltary Governor for Germany Sholto Douglas had noted, "the living conditions ... coupled with … a harsh winter" were likely to bring "not just death, [and] disease, but also serious discontent, and even ... popular unrest."
74 State legitimacy and, ultimately, governability were the driving concern. In the case of Berlin, Allied offices of public safety, health, housing, and political affairs were very much involved. But no less important were the citizens of each state who expected their postwar state to take care of them and expressed this expectation. A state's failure to do so would lead to dwindling legitimacy.
In the case of Berlin during the early months of occupation, Allies were particularly sensitive to German public opinion. Contrary to most descriptions in the histories of Allied occupation, the representatives of the so-called "Great Powers" in 1945 felt all but secure. The frequently-referenced experience of World War I had 71 The last prewar international architectural exhibit in Berlin, 1932 shown that having won a war did not automatically preclude future German aggression. The Allies were keenly aware of the challenge of pacifying Germans for the long term. In the earliest months of their governance in Germany, they spent much effort gauging popular opinion. Surveys conducted in Berlin and elsewhere, as well as popular opinion expressed in German media, showed great discontent on the part of Germans vis-à-vis the Allies. 75 Berliners lamented their standard of living and saw Hitler's prediction fulfilled, i.e. that "the peace would be terrible," that they would suffer under some Allied yoke, that health and living conditions would be close to unbearable. 76 Berliners did not greet the Allies as liberators in those early months, but as conquerors and enemies that had spread "terror." They still regarded the Allies' presence as "catastrophe" rather than liberation. 77 Allied housing procedures, furthermore, were repeatedly appealed and questioned in legal settings. 78 In a weak governance situation then, in which the Allied Control Council-the de jure government of Germany-lacked popular support, welfare policies which addressed health and housing concerns could be used to win over a skeptical and apprehensive population. Alternatively, policies the Germans considered insufficient, "nonsense," or detrimental would hinder such support.
Residents of immediate postwar Berlin, as elsewhere in Europe, approached their state's government with great expectations. The idea that a state was to provide for the wellbeing and, by extension, for the health of its citizens, rested on a longer tradition. At least since the Enlightenment, the strength of the European state had come to be identified with strength, resilience, and the well-being of its citizens. 79 During the French Revolution, with the establishment of a Health Committee of the National Constituent Assembly, "health" had been proclaimed "a natural right." And thus, as historian Anne La Berge has noted, "if governments were instituted to protect natural rights, then public health was the duty of the state." 80 By this logic, governments would lose legitimacy if they failed to protect those natural rights. These ideas had spread beyond France. Already a century prior to the Allied and Berliner debates of the 1940s, at a time of similar political crisis, Rudolf Virchow had emphasized that "any reasonable state constitution" would have to note firmly "the right of the individual to a healthy [gesundheitsgemäße] existence." 81 The wellbeing of every citizen would have to be ensured by the state and its government. 82 And as Jessica Reinisch has shown, this very Rudolf Virchow would become an icon for postwar Berlin medical officials. His calls for state and health reform were particularly hailed in the Soviet Zone. 83 Lay persons may have likewise come to equate state legitimacy with health. During the early part of the twentieth century, both the institutions of the German state and the scientific community, including social hygienicists, doctors, and statisticians, had spent considerable effort in presenting national health statistics to general audiences. In popularized form, such as in the International Hygiene Ausstellung in Dresden in 1911 and 1930/31, as well as the Grosse Ausstellung zur Gesundheitspflege, Soziale Fürsorge und Leibesübungen 1926 in Düsseldorf, the link between state and government legitimacy and collective strength or health of the nation, later volk, had been strongly emphasized. 84 Most importantly, the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s had brought health and state legitimacy to the forefront. "It is a cruel paradox, but war, despite its immediate, catastrophic effects on human well-being, has played a major role in the evolution of the welfare state," historian Gregory Kasza has noted about the emergence of the Japanese welfare state. 85 In Berlin, across Germany, and across Europe, the war is likely to have played this role. The Beveridge report and subsequent public health legislation in Britain would be unthinkable without the context of war which had at once empowered the interventionist state and strengthened the idea of the social contract. It encouraged popular demands vis-à-vis the state as caretaker. In France, likewise, the sacrifices made during the war had heightened popular expectations for health care and welfare in the postwar period. 86 State capacities to intervene, even after 1945, were not suddenly reduced, nor were expectations lesser. If anything, the apparatus of the state was needed to solve the massive crises of the postwar period: food, water, health, and housing (later on, also work) in halfdestroyed cities being among the most urgent problems to be addressed. Scholars working on postwar Eastern and Central European societies have argued that the postwar conditions and crises even led to a crescendo of planning and centralized state control, initially accompanied by popular approval. 87 In Western Europe, technocrats, conservative and socialist politicians alike, as well as large segments of society found a consensus and also embraced the expanded, mobilized capacities of the state to solve the crises of the postwar period. 88 Concerning the consensus on state planning and involvement, the Berlin and German case was typical, as were the motivations of those creating health and housing policy on location. Yet the peculiarity of the German setting should not be overlooked either. The role of National Socialism in the rise of the postwar European welfare idea is a paradoxical one. National Socialism's professed "socialism," coupled with its troubling emphasis on racial health and Volksgesundheit may have raised great expectations among a considerable portion of the German population. 89 To be clear: the National Socialist regime was anything but universally egalitarian with its emphasis on racial hierarchies and resulting health and death policies. Yet its rhetoric toward those considered part of the volk was egalitarian and, as historian Norbert Frei and others have pointed out, it helped spread "sentiments of equality" across former class divisions.
90 Equally important, the National Socialist compari-sons of German public health with those of the societies living under other political systems-propagated in film, press, professional and primary education, as well as in grand-scale exhibits such as Das Sowjetparadies-would have constructed a framework which linked a society's health and living standards with the legitimacy of its government. 91 This ideological framework, as the Berlin sources show, had been accepted and did not suddenly disappear in 1945. As the Allies keenly noted, Berliners in the fall of 1945 still invoked volkish health and so-called rights to life in a resentful, expectant tone. 92 Likewise, German medical officials' discourses in the immediate postwar period were clearly based on nationalist premises, as historian Jessica Reinisch has convincingly demonstrated. 93 Thus, among laypersons and professionals, neither terminology nor expectations had vanished in regards to public health and state responsibility. In the quest for legitimacy in the postwar quadripartite state, the Allies had to outperform the promises that Nazis had made to Germans. At the same time, the brutal, inhumane National Socialist regime and its selection based on pseudo-scientific notions of racial hygience also served as the anti-model. While the Allies had no distinct name yet for what we now refer to as the "Holocaust," and while they had not yet grasped the full extent of euthanasia programs, their increasing knowledge of these shaped their visions for the new order. From now on in Germany, there was to be no victimization or discrimination, and, ideally, welfare for all, not just for those at the top of some racist, socialdarwinist hierarchy.
94 Allied policy and their preceding discussion of living standards, even for Germany, seemed determined to teach Germans the centrality of basic and universal human rights.
Finally, the wider European and global context of health and human rights favored an interventionist state. In the Berlin case, neither lingering Nazi volkish welfare ideology and expectations, nor the Allied perceived necessity to outdo NS promises alone explain the prominence of ideas regarding the importance of state involvement in public health and welfare affairs. Equally important was an increasingly publicized international human rights discourse of which Berliners would have been aware and which their claims to Allied responsibility regarding public health reflected. Already in the 1945 documents of the Potsdam Conference, and certainly by the time of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948, the advocates of universal human rights proclaimed everyone's right to "a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of his family," and explicitly mandated states to ensure the adequacy of "housing and medical care." 95 The signatories of the 1946 Constitution of the World Health Organization had furthermore declared "the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health" to be "one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, political belief, economic or social condition."
96 This would presumably apply to Germans as well, despite their past. It would have also been known that the Allies in particular had been key in creating this WHO Constitution. Of all the national delegations to this conference, those of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Britain, and France had been the largest and most vocal. 97 And unlike the UN Declaration of Human Rights from which the Soviet Union had famously abstained, the WHO Constitution had seen no abstentions and had been unanimously adopted on 22 July 1946. 98 Health in this constitution had been defined in rather general and broad terms as "a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." 99 What was "social well-being"? This was not exactly defined, though the absence of social well-being, according to the constitution, seemed to merit governmental "social measures" such as the provision of housing.
100 Thus "governments," very explicitly, were charged with the "responsibility for the health of their peoples" and the "provision of adequate health and social measures." 101 And lest those governments responsible for health provisions and policies should fail to see the wide-reaching impact, this constitution, similar to Potsdam and UN provisions, linked health with security and peace, declaring health to be "basic to the happiness, harmonious relations and security of all peoples." 102 Likewise, it agreed with the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights which had provided that while the international community was to monitor abidance and, in the case of the WHO coordinate the work of individual governments and NGOs, as well as provide assistance and "promote ... the improvement of nutrition, housing, sanitation, economic or working conditions and other aspects of environmental hygiene," it was the duty of the individual nation states and their governments to ensure the right to health. 103 In short, the onus to provide for health and social welfare-the basis of peace at home and peaceful, healthy relations between nations-lay upon individual states and their governments. And again, failure to ensure these most basic rights would indicate a lack of legitimacy.
The increasing Cold War divide played another important role in the connection between health care, living standards and regime legitimacy. As has been shown in the case of hospital beds, or as could be shown in the case of general living and housing conditions, the Allies continuously challenged the legitimacy of one another by pointing to their competitors' deficiencies. Initially, this was done across the board. Eventually, an East-West divide became prominent. Comparisons between living and health standards became comparisons between different regimes and types of government. Yet while pronounced inter-Allied conflict prevailed among the divisions of manpower, economics, politics or transportation from July 1945 on, within the divisions of housing and health cooperation was the norm until 1947. Though milder than in other areas, competition and smear campaigns were not entirely absent. Both in direct correspondence and via the Berlin municipal offices and even the Berlin press, sometimes in the form of friendly reminders, more often blaming the other side for being ill-guided in their policies and practices, the Allies pointed to health and housing standards in various sectors to position themselves strategically vis-à-vis other claimants for power. 104 Thus the question of public health and housing appeared to be one not just concerning the health of Berliners and the Allied military on location, but one concerning the legitimacy of each of the four Allies.
Why then did they arrive at the idea of welfare and redistribution? Again, similar to the conditions after World War I, this can be explained in part by the idea of the social contract: citizens gave to the state during the war, and afterwards, they expected something in recompense. As previous historians have noted, for example Foucault in the case of Britain: "just at the moment when war was causing wholesale destruction, a society [had taken] upon itself the task of explicitly guaranteeing to its members not only the fact of life but of life lived in good health."
105 The postwar convergence in welfare ideas had indeed relied heavily on mobilization and its subsequent policies during World War II. In the course of the war, states across Europe had become increasingly interventionist regarding basic welfare and health services. And, as historians and political scientists have shown in the past four decades, already during the war economic planning, nationalized services for the mobilized masses, and a rhetoric of national solidarity and common sacrifice had led to some acceptance of the re-distributionist model. 106 The resistance movements across Europe had likewise embraced redistributionist policies for mere survival. 107 And finally, not just for mere governability issues but also from the point of view of the general population, the idea of redistribution had gained support, given not just a history of Nazi appropriation and redistribution but also the uneven destruction and loss of resources. Moreover, now the middle class was affected as well. Welfare models are more likely to be accepted in "homogeneous countries" where "issues of mutual distrust and misuse do not arise so acutely."
108 Across Europe, the war with its general mobilization, the effects of bombings, and the systematic evacuation of millions, as Mark Mazower and others have noted, had brought together "classes and communities hitherto divided or ignorant of one another." 109 In the case of Berlin housing this meant that now some members of the middle class lived in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions, sometimes in settings that mixed classes. It was perhaps less in a spirit of class solidarity or even mutual trust than in self-interest that the middle class now also embraced redistribution. For it had turned out that not all housing in the German capital was destroyed. The city was only partially destroyed. And while in some cases Berliners lived in overly crowded conditions, with sometimes more than 10 persons to a room, there was still plenty of undestroyed dwelling space. Once the gaze had moved beyond the immediate destruction which had at first seemed total, it was evident that a good number of Berliners lived well and with ample space. It was not uncommon that only one apartment of a building was rendered inhabitable while the rest remained intact. According to a 1946 Berlin municipal statistic, 19.1 percent of all Berlin housing Image 3. Partial rather than total destruction favored a redistributionist approach.
Courtesy of Landesarchiv Berlin/Otto Hagemann, 1947. was destroyed beyond repair. 110 This meant that there was a critical mass of Berliners affected and calling for redistribution. But it also meant that there were still enough resources to be distributed.
Not only Berliners, but also Soviet, American, British and French housing and health officials realized that, given the lack of monetary resources, redistribution would be the route to take.
111 Reconstruction was not an option in 1945 or 1946. Allied policy-writers, furthermore, had to take into account that their native countries also suffered a scarcity of funds and resources and that any resources going to Germany rather than to their own country would be met with scrutiny. 112 At the same time, charged with governing Berlin, the Allies were interested in governabil-ity and wanted Berliners content. Already in the fall of 1945, they had contemplated state-directed reallocation of resources, noting "there should be a complete survey made by sector and redistribution of population before [the] end [of] October for a) overcrowding, pure and simple, b) damaged conditions, c) unhealthy conditions." 113 While such redistribution proved a complicated affair, the ideas soon took hold in laws as well. As a result, for example, taxes for hospitals and building reconstruction were levied, and the joint Allied housing legislation of 1946 already included the idea of redistribution. The law justified this policy by noting that rights for living standards should be universal and available to all. 114 This basic premise of redistribution, not mere reconstruction, lay at the foundation of postwar Germany and would be continued after 1949 in both German states. 115 
Conclusion
As the European health and welfare models are being re-evaluated in our own time, it may be good to remind ourselves of the circumstances under which they evolved. The physical context, the debris coupled with a massive population flux, as well as an acute housing and health crisis, played an important role. The evidence of the Berlin case furthermore points to a physical setting in which Allies and local populations were aware of the commonality of the context beyond the confines of Berlin. In Berlin, they worked with each other, exchanging ideas and letters, visiting each other, founding think tanks on health and housing problems as they considered a problem shared by all. They likewise were part of an engaged global human rights discourse which came as a response to the racist, exclusivist policies of the National Socialists and which set out to make health rights universal. This is the positive view.
However, housing and health considerations and policies were not primarily motivated by a common concern about the well-being of the populations. Allies and local population alike heavily relied on a war-time tradition of state involvement and planning in regard to public health and housing. In other words, they continued along interventionist structures which had roots in earlier welfare policies, not least those established during World War II. Despite their bleak outlook on the shambles around them, Europeans had expectations vis-à-vis their governments. Finally, as this paper has argued, the postwar interventionist consensus was driven by Allied and German administrators' search for political order, security and legitimacy at a time in which these were deemed painfully absent.
The late Historian Tony Judt has reminded us to pay attention to the significance of the early postwar period across Europe as one in which the groundwork for the latter half of the twentieth century was laid.
116 And he has reminded us of the conditions at the time: in these first postwar years, most Europeans did not expect a bright future. 117 The world to them was threatening, unclear and disordered. All across Europe, cities and entire societies were in shambles.
118 Almost all European countries shared a severe housing crisis. And in all settings, not least in the case of Berlin, war and catastrophe as well as the immanent danger of epidemics and unrest gave rise to discussions about the ideal redistribution of space and power, about a new order, and about the prevention of future calamities, not least of all aggressive nationalist politics and the rise of yet another Hitler. 117 Ibid., 3, 13. 118 Ibid., 13-40. 
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